Applied Materials [AMAT]
As of 2026-07-29 · framework v1.5.1 · spot $440.02 · shared comparator set: KLAC, LRCX, AMAT, ASML, TER
STATE B — cyclical / commodity-sensitive.
valuation.md places LRCX in State B by name; the same test
returns B for all three.valuation.md: "A median of annual observations over a partial window inherits that window's start
point." So the window is stated explicitly. FY2021-FY2025 contains one complete WFE cycle —
the FY2022 peak (30.2%), the FY2023-24 memory trough (28.9%) and FY2025 (29.2%) — a notably shallow cycle in margin terms. A median across it is a mid-cycle figure with a dated start, not an artefact of where the
window happens to begin.
Where the forecast begins in the cycle: at or very near the peak. Three independent markers, none of
them a forecast:
1. Backlog coverage is falling while revenue rises (see AMAT_Research.md §2).
2. China revenue share has already rolled over from its FY2024 peak.
3. The name trades at the 98th percentile of its own ten-year TTM P/E history.
Terminal EBIT margin: 29.2%
Basis. Own FY2021-FY2025 median operating margin (29.2%), which equals the FY2025 reported consolidated operating margin from the 10-K segment note. AMAT's operating margin has sat in a 28.9-30.2% band for five consecutive years including the FY2023-24 memory trough — the cycle normalisation and the trailing actual coincide, so NO haircut is applied.
Opex bridge. 48.7% gross - 12.6% RD&E - 6.2% SG&A - 0.6% restructuring = 29.2% EBIT, taken directly from the FY2025 10-K segment note (R83); constraint 29.2% <= 48.7% satisfied.
Hard constraint check: m_EBIT,T (29.2%) <= m_gross,T (47.3%) —
satisfied, using the five-year median gross margin (47.3%) rather than the higher
trailing figure (49.0%), so the constraint is tested on the more conservative of the two.
Relation to trailing actual. Trailing FY operating margin is 29.5%; terminal is 29.2%, a gap of -0.3pp. The brief requires that a terminal margin below the trailing actual be justified rather than assumed. It is not below trailing here — the five-year median and the trailing actual coincide, because the margin has been range-bound for five years including a trough. No haircut is applied and none is needed.
EV_T / EBIT_T = (1-t)(1-g/ROIC) / (WACC-g)
With t = 0.15, g = 0.04, ROIC = 0.30, WACC = 0.095:
(0.85)(1 - 0.04/0.30) / (0.095 - 0.04) = **13.4x**
Exit multiple used: 13.4x EV/EBIT. Today's traded multiple is 40.6x, so the underwritten compression is 67% (40.6x → 13.4x). Per rule 3, an exit multiple below today's is often correct and is not itself a bear assumption; the test is consistency with terminal growth, ROIC, reinvestment and cost of capital, and the identity above is what supplies it.
Reference-class validity (rule 6). The comparator set is
KLAC, LRCX, AMAT, ASML, TER — a WFE oligopoly plus ASML (litho) and TER (test) as reference. It satisfies
n >= 5 mature profitable firms with a matching operating model. But it carries almost no information in
the dimension being matched, and that must be said rather than hidden: KLAC, LRCX and AMAT trade at
39.5x / 40.9x / 40.6x EV/EBIT across operating margins spanning 29.5% to 41.7% and growth spanning
11.4% to 16.4%. There is no slope. This is the same failure valuation.md records as
"29.9x / 29.9x / 30.4x across 8pp of exit growth, no slope". A peer-median exit multiple for this
cluster is therefore UNIDENTIFIED, which is precisely why the exit multiple here is derived from the
identity and the peer figure is used only as a sanity check.
reverse_dcf.py --spot 440.02 --shares 793.959 --net-cash 1786 --revenue 29024.0 --years 5 --wacc 0.095 --terminal-margin 0.292 --exit-multiple 13.4
| Required revenue CAGR | 37.0% |
| Demonstrated revenue CAGR (5y) | 11.4% |
| Margin (demonstrated − required) | -25.6pp |
| Exit multiple solved at | 13.4x |
| Implied compression from today | 40.6x → 13.4x (67%) |
VERDICT: FAIL. The price requires 37.0% revenue CAGR for five years against
11.4% demonstrated — a 25.6pp shortfall. Per criteria.md this
would be PASS WITH ARGUMENT only if the excess were backed by a specific evidenced driver. The named
driver (memory/HBM capex) is real, but the company's own backlog and deferred-revenue disclosure runs the
other way — coverage is falling, not building — so the argument fails on the company's own evidence, not
on narrative grounds.
| Exit EV/EBIT | Required revenue CAGR |
|---|---|
| 13.4x (identity-derived, used) | 37.0% |
| 13.9x | 36.0% |
| 16x | 32.2% |
| 18x | 29.1% |
| 22x | 24.0% |
| 26x | 20.0% |
| 30x | 16.6% |
| 35x | 13.0% |
| 40.6x (= today's traded multiple) | ~9.8% |
| 45x | 7.5% |
Flip point: the exit multiple at which today's price only requires the demonstrated 11.4% CAGR is 37.6x — against a traded multiple of 40.6x. So the bet embedded in today's price is not that AMAT grows: it is that AMAT still trades at ~38x EV/EBIT in 2031, having compressed barely at all, five years into a cyclical business. Stating it that way is the point of the instrument.
Target: $397.03 (-9.8% to spot $440.02).
valuation.md.Why the 90th percentile and not the median. This is the calibration judgement, made explicitly. The median (15.4x) would put the target at $242 (-45%) and would be mean-reversion by reflex — exactly the error the brief names as the most expensive recurring one in this project. The 90th percentile keeps the multiple in the top decile of the name's own range, conceding that this cycle is larger than its predecessors and that the earnings are real, while declining to underwrite the 98th percentile as a base case for a further twelve months. The whole 12-month result in this cluster is a multiple judgement, not an earnings judgement — earnings estimates are rising and that is already in the NTM figure.
Note on target-below-spot. Item B16 warns that a process whose every target sits below spot is expressing a house market view rather than valuing companies. That check is passed here on cluster construction rather than by assertion: two of the three targets come out above spot (KLAC +2.4%, LRCX +0.8%) and one below (AMAT −9.8%), from the same method and the same percentile anchor. The dispersion comes from the names' own multiple histories, which is what it should come from.
On 794.0m shares, applying the name's own ten-year operating-margin markers to TTM revenue of $29,024m, at a 15% tax rate:
| Cycle position | Operating margin | EBIT ($m) | Net income ($m) | EPS | P/E at $440.02 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Trough | 19.9% | 5,776 | 4,909 | 6.18 | 71.2x |
| Mid-cycle (terminal) | 29.2% | 8,475 | 7,204 | 9.07 | 48.5x |
| Peak (trailing) | 29.5% | 8,564 | 7,279 | 9.17 | 48.0x |
Note this holds revenue at the trailing level and flexes only margin, so it isolates margin cyclicality. Revenue is itself cyclical, so a true trough combines both and is worse than the top row.
Named cause: China export controls plus the DRAM share slide. China is $8.53bn (30.1%) of FY2025 revenue, and AMAT is the name with the broadest exposure to Chinese trailing-edge capacity — the segment most directly in the path of further US export restrictions and of Chinese domestic-equipment substitution, which is a structural rather than cyclical loss. Note the tell already in the filings: DRAM fell from 28% to 26% of Semiconductor Systems revenue in FY2025, during the memory boom. AMAT is the least memory-levered of the three (memory ~24% of total revenue), so if foundry/logic capex digests while memory carries the cycle, AMAT participates least on the way up and still de-rates on the way down. Combine the FY2019 trough operating margin (22.9%) with a 20% revenue decline to $23.2bn and EBIT is ~$5.3bn, net income ~$4.5bn, EPS ~$5.68. At the p50 of its own ten-year multiple (15.4x) that is $88/share, −80%. At the p75 (19.6x), $111/share, −75%.
Probability: 20%. Not a going-concern case: net cash $1.79bn, investment grade. No going-concern flag.
Note on the asymmetry. AMAT has the cleanest accounting and the most stretched multiple relative to its own history (40.7x against a p90 of 25.2x — the widest gap in the cluster). Clean books do not protect a multiple.
| Criteria | Type | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Quality | BINDING | PASS — COMPOUNDER archetype (profitable, 49.0% gross / 29.5% operating margin, ROIC >> WACC, evidenced reinvestment in R&D at 12.6% of revenue). Note the screen tagged AMAT INFLECTION; that is wrong and is a downstream consequence of a defective operating-margin input (see AMAT_Financial_Model_Notes.md). |
| Valuation | BINDING | FAIL — required 37.0% vs demonstrated 11.4% CAGR, margin -25.6pp |
| Downside | MEASURED | scored, §6 |
| Liquidity | BINDING | PASS — mega-cap, $349bn market cap; vehicle = equity |
| Momentum | MEASURED | negative near term — spot $440.02 vs prior close $476.29 (-7.6%) on a cluster-wide drawdown day |
| Catalyst | MEASURED | see AMAT_Catalyst_Calendar.md |
| Consensus | MEASURED | revisions one-sided positive; see §4 |
| Peer Spread | MEASURED | 98th percentile of own 10y P/E; cluster shows no multiple dispersion (§2) |
| Sub-sector | MEASURED | Semi-cap equipment (WFE) |
No position verdict is issued. The memo scores Criteria; the book decides.