Phase Space AI

Trade Construction

AST SpaceMobile [ASTS]

AST SpaceMobile, Inc. [ASTS] — Trade Construction, Liquidity & Risk

as of 2026-07-29 · spot $53.03 (SIP close) · no position verdict is issued here

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1. Liquidity Criteria — PASS (BINDING)

1.1 The IEX/SIP correction, measured across the cluster

Recorded for the calibration file: on these three names IEX carried 1.8%–2.8% of consolidated volume, not the assumed 5%, so the 20x multiplier understated true volume by 44%–64%. SIP was entitled in this environment and was used directly; no scaling was applied and none was needed. The multiplier is a fallback for when SIP is unavailable, not a substitute for it — and when used it should be ~35x–55x on names of this profile, not 20x.

1.2 Share liquidity

PASS, trivially: a $10m position is 1.0% of one day's volume. Note that the 60-day ADV ($1,906m) is 87% higher than the 20-day ($1,018m) — volume is falling as the price falls, which is the opposite of a capitulation pattern and suggests the selling is orderly rather than forced.

1.3 Options chain — pulled, not assumed

Active chain, expirations 2026-09-01 to 2027-07-01 (492 contracts):

Jan-2027 snapshot (2026-07-29):

The brief's expectation that chains on names this size are uninvestable is false on all three names in this cluster, and most emphatically on ASTS. 200,507 contracts of open interest in the January expiry, 145,232 in September, quoted sizes in the hundreds, and spreads of 6%–9% of mid at the liquid strikes — the tightest in the cluster and better than many mid-caps.

Implied volatility 99%–108% against 252-day realised of 108.9%: a ratio of 0.91x–0.99x. Options are priced at or slightly below realised volatility.

Vehicle assessment. ASTS is the one name in this cluster where the option market is unambiguously the better instrument, and the reason is structural rather than tactical: ASTS_Valuation.md establishes that this is an option on spectrum and a constellation, not a discountable cash-flow stream, and that its 12-month distribution spans $3.84 to $142.98. A payoff that wide is what options are for, and a linear position in the common stock is the worst way to hold it.

• Long convexity, if a book wanted the upside: Jan-2027 $70/$90 call spread — pay 10.25, sell 6.19, net 4.06 for a $20 maximum payoff (4.9:1), break-even $74.06, open interest 5,515 / 10,311, both quoted in size. Compare that with the reference-mid case of $80.50 and the reference-high of $142.98.
• Defined-risk downside, if a book wanted protection: Jan-2027 $40 put at 7.03 costs 13.3% of spot for a strike 25% below. Expensive in absolute terms, but the financing-gap scenario in §4 has the stock at $12–20, where that put is worth $20–28.
• The stock alone exposes a book to the full 37-fold reference band with no asymmetry, on a name 35.9% below both moving averages and 60.2% below its 52-week high.

All three structures are stated as executable and priced. None is recommended — the memo issues no verdict.

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2. Position sizing (hypothetical)

Volatility, not liquidity, constrains size. But on ASTS inverse-volatility sizing is doing less work than usual, and this should be said explicitly. The framework's interim protection rests on the observation that "a fat-left-tail name is almost always a high-volatility name and is sized down automatically." ASTS is a high-volatility name and is sized down. The residual risk it does not capture is that the left tail here is a financing event, which is discontinuous — a dilutive rescue raise does not arrive as a series of 5% daily moves that a volatility estimate absorbs. A book relying on the inverse-vol scalar alone is protected against the path and not against the event.

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3. Entry, exit, invalidation

Momentum Criteria (MEASURED, timing only, blocks nothing): 12-1 momentum +63.4%, positive. Against that: −38.9% in one month, −24.1% in three months, 35.9% below a 50-day and 200-day that have converged at $82.71/$82.78. This is the most violent breakdown in the cluster and the convergence of the two moving averages at the same level is itself a signal that the 12-month uptrend has fully unwound. The criterion says when; it says not now.

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4. Downside Criteria — MEASURED, logged, blocks nothing

Named cause: a financing gap arriving at a moment when the equity cannot absorb it.

A going-concern case must be argued explicitly on this name, and here it is. ASTS is not insolvent and is not close to it, but it is the only name in this cluster where the downside is a financing event rather than a de-rating, and the mechanism is fully documented in its own filings.

The chain of facts:

1. Cash and restricted cash fell from $3,458.9m (2026-03-31) to ~$2,723m (2026-06-30) — roughly $736m in one quarter (8-K 2026-07-15, preliminary and so labelled by the company).
2. It raised $983.6m net thirteen days later (8-K 2026-07-20, $1.0bn of 1.625% 2034 converts), of which $96.9m went straight out to buy capped calls. Net new liquidity: ~$886.7m — approximately one quarter of consumption.
3. Debt face is now ~$4,024m against ~$3,610m of pro-forma cash: net debt of ~$414m, versus net cash of $487m three months ago.
4. Committed spending that does not stop: operating expenses of $164.1m a quarter and rising (engineering services +$56.9m year-on-year); $540–560m of purchase commitments including $200–250m of minimum launch commitments; ≥$80m a year of L-band payments to Ligado plus the Crown Castle annual payment; $24.3m a quarter of interest on a stack that has since grown by $1bn.
5. Revenue does not fund any of it. TTM revenue is $84.9m, 63.9% of it in one quarter, none of it the product, and Q1-2026 was $14.7m.
6. The equity has fallen 60.2% from its 52-week high, so each further raise costs more shares. The October 2025 ATM's entire $800m capacity was used and the programme terminated on 2026-03-17 — that route is closed until a new one is filed.
7. The Sound Point $550m facility is undrawn and conditional on regulatory approvals that have not been obtained. Its availability expires 2026-10-05, extendable 180 days for a further 1% fee ($5.5m). ASTS is paying a 0.15% monthly ticking fee to keep open a facility it cannot currently draw.
8. A satellite has already been written off — the 10-Q pre-announces the Block 2 BB7 asset write-off.
9. $100m of the Ligado consideration, paid around 2026-03-31, was placed in escrow by Bankruptcy Court order on 2026-04-02 and its distribution is "subject to further order of the Bankruptcy Court".

The company's own framing, which is more candid than most:

"Until such time, if ever, as we can generate substantial revenues to support our cost structure, we expect to finance cash needs through the issuance of equity, equity-linked or debt securities… To the extent that we raise additional capital through the sale of equity or convertible debt securities, the ownership interest of stockholders will be, or could be, diluted… There can be no assurance that additional funds will be available to us on favourable terms or at all."

Note the offsetting facts, because the bear case must not be overstated. ASTS has raised $4.8bn+ of debt and equity since January 2025 and has never failed to fund. The 2036 and 2034 converts carry coupons of 1.625%–2.25% — cheap money. Interest income of $27.0m currently exceeds interest expense of $24.3m. The UBS loan is non-recourse and cash-collateralised. And the technology works: four carriers have completed live calls, and regulatory approvals for the service were received on 2026-04-22. This is a company with demonstrated market access, not one being shut out.

Going-concern assessment: NOT a going-concern case today, and flagged as the risk to re-test at each financing date. Roughly $3.6bn of pro-forma cash against ~$700m a quarter of total consumption is about five quarters of runway, before any further raise and before the undrawn $550m Sound Point facility and $49.5m of remaining Trinity capacity. The company will need to raise again inside twelve months on its current burn, and it has raised successfully seven times in eighteen months.

The 30% bear weight is a judgement input, not an output, logged for Brier scoring per criteria.md. It is the same weight used on OUST and lower than the 40% used on ONDS, and the reasoning is explicit: ASTS's bear case requires something to go wrong (a launch or cost setback, or a Ligado failure), whereas ONDS's requires only that its acquisitions stop. A bear case that needs an event is less probable than one that needs an absence.

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5. What the book is actually being asked to underwrite

AST SpaceMobile is a pre-commercial LEO direct-to-device satellite operator with five satellites in orbit, a working technology demonstrated live with AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, Rakuten and Bell Canada, four definitive carrier agreements, $1.2bn of remaining performance obligations of which 91.6% falls beyond twelve months, ~$1.9bn of tangible programme assets, a contingent spectrum position dependent on a Chapter 11 closing, $4,024m of debt, ~$700m a quarter of cash consumption, and $84.9m of trailing revenue — 63.9% of it in one quarter — none of which is the product it intends to sell.

At $53.03 the enterprise value is $20,999m, or 247.2x trailing revenue. The five-year implied path requires a 178.9% revenue CAGR at a 15% terminal margin and 18x exit, and at a 5% terminal margin no exit multiple between 0.1x and 200x justifies the price at all.

Quality Criteria INDETERMINATE (the input required — the margin of the business being underwritten — does not exist) · Valuation Criteria FAIL, with a no-solution region · Liquidity Criteria PASS · momentum says the 12-month uptrend has fully unwound.

One of three BINDING Criteria fails outright, one cannot be scored, one passes. The book decides — and it should decide knowing that the instrument which returned FAIL is the wrong instrument for this asset, and that the memo says so in ASTS_Valuation.md §5 rather than hiding behind the number.