BillionToOne [BLLN]
Workbook: BLLN_model.xlsx — six tabs, live formulas throughout. Every figure below was read back
out of Microsoft Excel after a forced recalculation, not computed in Python and pasted.
Tie-out to the filed FY2025 10-K (Income Statement tab, rows 22–28). This is the check that matters, because a zero balance check verifies internal consistency and not input accuracy:
| Line | Filed | Model | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 305.112 | 305.112 | 0.00 |
| Gross profit | 208.458 | 208.458 | 0.00 |
| R&D | 49.384 | 49.384 | 0.00 |
| SG&A | 143.051 | 143.051 | 0.00 |
| Operating income | 16.023 | 16.023 | 0.00 |
| Net income | 7.454 | 7.454 | 0.00 |
Balance check: 0.00 at FY2024, FY2025 and Q1-2026.
Key computed outputs: WACC 11.45%; EV $6,639.27m; FY2035E EBIT $517.0m; DCF value/share $53.35 (Gordon) and $79.90 (4.5x exit); scenario targets $74.63 / $136.01 / $203.62; E[R] +0.64%, hurdle 4.7%, verdict FAIL.
An independent Python implementation produced $53.20 and $80.25 for the same two DCF cases — agreement to within 0.5%, which is the cross-check that the workbook is doing what it claims.
The skill requires verification by actually opening the file rather than trusting that a formula string was written without error. Both of the following produced a workbook that looked fine and was badly wrong:
Assumptions!$B$19, which is
the beta cell (1.35), not WACC — i.e. the model was discounting at 135%. D&A, capex, ΔNWC,
terminal growth and the exit multiple were all similarly off by three rows, and the cost-of-equity
formula itself multiplied the wrong two cells. Fixed and re-verified.Neither error would have been caught by the balance check, which read 0.00 throughout.
| FY2026E | FY2027E | FY2030E | FY2035E | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue ($m) | 462 | 615 | 1,105 | 1,880 |
| Gross margin | 73.0% | 72.5% | 71.0% | 71.0% |
| R&D % of revenue | 12.5% | 12.0% | 10.5% | 10.0% |
| SG&A % of revenue | 44.0% | 42.0% | 35.5% | 33.5% |
| Operating margin | 16.5% | 18.5% | 25.0% | 27.5% |
D&A 1.6% of revenue; capex 4.5%; ΔNWC 10% of incremental revenue. Cash tax steps 3% → 23% as the $256.8m accumulated deficit and its full valuation allowance are absorbed.
The Base case takes revenue from $305m (FY2025) to $1,105m (FY2030) — a 29.4% five-year CAGR. Against the reference class (Chan, Karceski & Lakonishok 2003), growth persistence beyond chance is close to nonexistent and sustained >20% growth for five-plus years is a top-decile outcome. The Base case is therefore explicitly a top-decile assumption, and the memo names that prior rather than assuming it away.
The sector counter-evidence is real and is stated alongside: Natera compounded revenue from $391m (2020) to $2,337m (TTM) at roughly 35%, and Exact Sciences did likewise. Molecular diagnostics with expanding reimbursement is one of the few reference classes where the base rate genuinely beats the all-industry prior — but only for the winners, and survivorship is exactly what a base rate is supposed to correct for.
The Bull case (37.0% five-year CAGR) is labelled as optionality, not expectation. The reverse-DCF path implied by the current price — FY2035 revenue of ~$3,515m, or 11.5x FY2025 — sits above even the Bull case, which is the core valuation finding.