Bitdeer Technologies Group

BTDR · investment memo

Valuation margin
demonstrated − required CAGR

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Required CAGR

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Demonstrated

—

Terminal margin

—

Exit multiple

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Company state

Terminal margin basis

NOT ESTABLISHED, and null is the correct record. BTDR is loss-making at the group level and valuation.md requires a named, evidenced mechanism before a loss-maker may be granted a positive terminal margin. The prose supplies none: gross margin FELL from 21.1% to 9.8% while the hardware line scaled, so it is not yet demonstrated that the ASIC business is accretive to group margin; the reported swing from a -$599.2m loss to a +$65.6m profit is driven entirely by a $444.9m derivative mark, so the underlying operating-margin CHANGE is INDETERMINATE from the filing; and there is no quarterly XBRL at all (latest data 2025-12-31, seven months stale). No terminal margin is computed here because doing so would be re-underwriting, and a peer-median substitute is exactly the defect documented on 22 loss-making names in the scan.

Risk & exit

Four distinct questions, one field each. A price is not a thesis: the trigger below forces a re-underwrite and freezes further purchases — it is never an automatic sell.

Risk trigger
25% below the memo price

$6.69

A daily close below $6.69 triggers a mandatory re-underwrite and freezes further purchases. It is not an automatic sell unless a separate fundamental invalidation condition has been breached.

Thesis-invalidation conditions

Fundamental and falsifiable, never price-based. If one is satisfied the thesis is marked dead and the position is retained only by explicit decision.

Failure to refinance the $753.8m of current borrowings, or refinancing at materially dilutive terms. This is the binding constraint and it includes $275.0m owed to a related party.
Gross margin below 9.8%. It has fallen 21.1% → 19.0% → 9.8% over three years while R&D rose to 24.8% of revenue. A fourth consecutive decline would establish that scale is not producing operating leverage.
The ASIC line reverting toward zero. It went $2,000 → $585,000 → $108,328,000; a single year is not a trend, and it is the only genuinely non-bitcoin, non-declining revenue line BTDR has.
Any disclosure on the $135.6m of "cryptocurrencies — receivables" identifying a counterparty of poor quality.

Impairment case

Named cause: the current-debt wall, against a deteriorating gross margin and no visible interim data. This is the most concrete near-term solvency structure in the cluster: $753.8m of borrowings fall due within twelve months against $149.4m of cash, and cash fell 69% during FY2025. Meeting them requires monetising inventories ($252.0m of ASIC stock, in a market where BTDR is itself the seller), the crypto position ($218.6m, of which $135.6m is a *receivable* from an unidentified counterparty), or refinancing — including $275.0m owed to a related party, whose willingness to roll is a governance

Documents

BTDR Catalyst Calendar BTDR Financial Model Notes BTDR Research BTDR Trade Construction BTDR Valuation

Generated from each name's analysis.json. Figures are research output, not investment advice. Gaps are shown as “—” rather than filled: a missing input is recorded as indeterminate, never estimated.