Coherent [COHR]
Spot $222.19 (2026-07-29). Two outputs are produced, as required: a 12-month target and the 5-year implied-path test. Neither replaces the other.
Evidence for B, not A:
Not C: COHR is profitable and has been for nine straight quarters; the terminal period does not carry essentially all the value (TTM EBITDA is $1.29bn). Not D: the reverse DCF returns a solution across the whole plausible exit-multiple range.
valuation.mdCOHR's earnings are early-cycle and its multiple is late-cycle.
The forecast therefore begins early in the earnings cycle and at the top of the valuation cycle. That asymmetry is the whole COHR question, and it is why the exit multiple decides the answer.
evidence_grade: B. Filings are current and tie to AV; guidance is explicit and dated; the
weaknesses are the absent AR-concentration disclosure, the absent design-win disclosure, and the
unavailable consensus (§6 of the research file).
Underwritten terminal EBIT margin: 20.0%.
| Source | Figure |
|---|---|
| Own non-GAAP operating margin, actual Q2FY26 | 19.9% |
| Own non-GAAP operating margin trajectory | 16.1% (Q2FY25) → 18.0% → 19.5% → 19.9% → 21.3% guided Q4FY26 |
| Own GAAP operating margin, TTM | 10.28% |
| Own GAAP operating margin, best quarter | 11.8% (Q2FY26) |
m_EBIT,T = m_gross,T − R&D − SG&A − other| Line | Terminal | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | 42.0% | Q4FY26 guided non-GAAP 39–41%; TTM 37.0%; 6-inch InP at <50% the 3-inch die cost; 1.6T ASPs and margins above 800G (CEO, Q&A); Munich divestiture removes a below-corporate-margin business |
| R&D | (9.5%) | 10% of revenue in FY2024 and FY2025; modest scale benefit only — COHR should not underinvest here |
| SG&A | (11.5%) | 20% FY2023 → 18% FY2024 → 16% FY2025, falling on volume |
| Other | (1.0%) | residual acquired-intangible amortisation tail |
| = Terminal EBIT margin | 20.0% |
Hard constraint m_EBIT,T ≤ m_gross,T: 20.0% ≤ 42.0% ✓. The bridge leaves 22.0pp of revenue for
all R&D, selling and administrative cost against 26.0pp today — a tightening, not a fantasy.
valuation.md requires that a terminal margin below trailing be justified; this one is above, and
the bridge is mechanical rather than aspirational:
The screen carried terminal_margin: 0.144, terminal_margin_basis: "max(own, sector peer median)".
That is the fifth recorded failure of this one parameter (known-silent-failures.md §9.8) and it
is a banned construction: max(own, industry_median) can only ever flatter a low-margin business and
can only ever cap a high-margin one. Applied here it took a business guiding to a 21.3% non-GAAP
operating margin and assigned it 14.4% — 5.6pp too low — because it was averaging COHR against a
"sector" median it did not derive from COHR's own economics. Correcting it raises the terminal margin
and therefore lowers the required growth: the correction moves the answer toward PASS, which is
worth stating because it removes any suspicion that the correction was chosen for its direction.
valuation.md rule 4: the exit multiple is not an independent parameter.
EV_T / EBIT_T = (1 − t)(1 − g/ROIC) / (WACC − g)
| Parameterisation | t | g | ROIC | WACC | Derived multiple |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative terminal growth | 20% | 4.5% | 18% | 10.0% | 10.9x |
| Base | 20% | 6.0% | 20% | 10.0% | 14.0x |
| Sustained AI cadence | 20% | 7.0% | 25% | 10.0% | 19.2x |
Base exit multiple adopted: 15.0x, at the upper edge of the base parameterisation.
Recorded in full in COHR_analysis.json. EV/EBIT is distorted across this entire cluster because GAAP
EBIT is depressed by acquired-intangible amortisation everywhere, so EV/EBITDA is shown alongside.
| Name | 3y rev CAGR | TTM YoY | Gross margin | Op margin | EV/Sales | EV/EBIT | EV/EBITDA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| COHR | 10.9% | 18.0% | 37.0% | 10.3% | 6.70x | 65.2x | 34.2x |
| APH | 32.2% | 54.2% | 38.5% | 27.2% | 6.56x | 24.1x | 20.7x |
| ANET | 26.0% | 30.6% | 63.5% | 42.8% | 19.44x | 45.4x | 44.6x |
| AVGO | 29.1% | 32.3% | 67.0% | 43.7% | 24.53x | 56.2x | 44.4x |
| MRVL | 14.6% | 34.1% | 50.6% | 16.2% | 16.88x | 104.2x | 54.6x |
| CIEN | 11.4% | 30.6% | 43.0% | 11.2% | 8.73x | 78.1x | 60.3x |
| LITE | 11.0% | 69.0% | 37.7% | 10.1% | 24.76x | 245.2x | 121.8x |
| CRDO | 93.5% | 205.7% | 68.0% | 33.3% | 24.47x | 73.4x | 68.1x |
| ALAB | 129.8% | 104.2% | 76.0% | 22.4% | 43.96x | 196.6x | 188.6x |
| AAOI | 31.4% | 64.3% | 29.6% | −11.6% | 10.92x | n/a | n/a |
Reference-class assertion. valuation.md rule 6 requires n≥5 mature profitable firms, a matching
operating model, and dispersion in the matched dimension. Only APH matches COHR's operating model
— a vertically integrated interconnect components manufacturer earning a mid-to-high-30s gross margin.
ANET, AVGO and CRDO are fabless or systems businesses at 63–68% gross margin; LITE and CIEN carry GAAP
EBIT so depressed that their EV/EBIT figures (245x, 78x) carry no information. n=1 on a matched
operating model, and the class therefore fails the n≥5 test: the peer-derived exit multiple is
UNIDENTIFIED.
Consequently the derived multiple is used as the base and APH's traded 24.1x is carried only as the
upper bound of the sensitivity. The base 15.0x sits below the only stated anchor (24.1x), which
valuation.md prohibits absent a separately argued reason. The reason: APH's demonstrated 3-year
revenue CAGR (32.2%) is 3x COHR's (10.9%) and its operating margin (27.2%) is 2.6x COHR's (10.3%), so
anchoring COHR at APH's multiple imports growth and profitability COHR has not demonstrated — and APH
carries no leverage against COHR's 1.7x. The argument is recorded rather than applied silently.
Terminal value is >90% of EV in every parameterisation, so the reverse DCF is the mandatory primary long-horizon output and the forward DCF is not run.
reverse_dcf.py --spot 222.19 --shares 195.639 --net-cash -776.1 --revenue 6602.4
--years 5 --wacc 0.10 --terminal-margin 0.200 --solve cagr
Held fixed and named: terminal EBIT margin 20.0%; WACC 10.0%; horizon 5 years; TTM revenue $6,602.4m; diluted shares 195.639m (10-Q cover, verified); net debt $776.1m (10-Q, verified); EV $44,245m.
| Exit multiple | Required 5y revenue CAGR | Margin vs demonstrated 18.0% |
|---|---|---|
| 11.0x | 37.45% | −19.45pp |
| 13.0x | 32.93% | −14.93pp |
| 15.0x (base) | 29.18% | −11.18pp |
| 18.0x | 24.56% | −6.56pp |
| 21.0x | 20.77% | −2.77pp |
| 24.1x (APH traded) | 17.54% | +0.46pp |
Flip point: exit multiple 23.6x. Above it the name passes; below it, it fails.
Demonstrated − required = 18.0% − 29.18% = −11.18pp.
Demonstrated is the TTM year-over-year rate (+18.0%). The 3-year CAGR is 10.9%, on which the margin is −18.3pp; both windows are reported. The 3-year window contains the FY2024 telecom inventory correction and understates the current regime, so TTM YoY is used as the primary measure and the 3-year figure is disclosed rather than discarded.
Current EV/EBIT is 65.2x. The base path exits at 15.0x — a compression of 50.2 turns, 77.0%. On EV/EBITDA: 34.2x today to an implied 15.0x × (20.0% ÷ (20.0% + ~6% D&A)) ≈ 11.5x, a 66% compression. The required path is not only 29.2% revenue compounding — it is 29.2% compounding into a multiple three-quarters below today's.
At the demonstrated 18.0% CAGR and a 15.0x exit, the required terminal margin is 31.45% against the underwritten 20.0% — a shortfall of −11.45pp. Both axes of the surface fail by almost exactly the same amount, which is the signature of a price that is simply above the underwriting rather than of a single mis-set parameter.
The price requires 29.18% five-year revenue compounding against 18.0% demonstrated. Is there a "specific, evidenced reason" that reaches 29.2%, which would make this PASS WITH ARGUMENT?
The evidence reaches roughly 21–25%, not 29%: - FY2026 tracking +21.4% (9M actual $5,073.0m + Q4 guide midpoint $1,980m = $7,053m). - FY2027 guided above that rate — the guide sets a floor of 21.4%, not a level of 29%. - Q4FY26 guided +29.5% YoY — the single quarter does reach the required rate, but a one-quarter print is not a five-year path. - The named mechanisms (1.6T ramp, 6-inch InP, OCS, CPO) are real and specific, and they support acceleration above 21%. None of them is quantified to a level that supports 29% for five consecutive years, and design wins — the disclosure that would quantify it — are not published.
FAIL, by −11.18pp, with the exit multiple named as the decisive parameter and the flip point stated at 23.6x. A reader who believes COHR warrants APH's traded 24.1x should read this as a marginal PASS; that disagreement is located precisely, which is the point of reporting the flip point.
The table above is the sensitivity. A 1.0x change in the exit multiple moves the required CAGR by approximately 1.3pp. Nothing else in the model has comparable leverage: a ±2pp change in the terminal margin moves the required CAGR by ~1.9pp, and a ±100bp change in WACC by ~1.5pp.
Target $271. +21.9% to spot $222.19.
valuation.md step 1 is "start from near-term consensus." That input does not exist for this name:
AV EARNINGS_ESTIMATES returns an empty array for COHR, FN and LITE while returning 22–41 records for
CRDO, CIEN and AAOI on the same key in the same minute. The substitution is declared here rather than
hidden: company guidance replaces consensus, which is a legitimate substitute only because COHR's
guidance is quantified, dated and filed (8-K 2026-05-06).
| Step | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| FY2026 revenue | $7,053m (+21.4%) | 9M actual $5,073.0m + Q4 guide midpoint $1,980m |
| FY2027 revenue | $8,816m (+25.0%) | guide: FY2027 growth exceeds FY2026's 21.4%; 25% adopted, above the guided floor and below the Q4FY26 exit rate of +29.5% |
| Multiple | 6.10x EV/Sales | own history: current 6.70x = 91st percentile of 262 observations since 2021-05-17; median 0.0165 vs current 0.0337 on the price/TTM-revenue metric. 6.10x ≈ 85th percentile — a modest de-rate, not mean reversion |
| Implied EV | $53,778m | |
| Less net debt | ($776m) | |
| Equity | $53,002m | |
| ÷ 195.639m shares | $270.91 |
Each appears dated in COHR_Catalyst_Calendar.md: FY2026 Q4 results and the first FY2027 guide
(mid-August 2026); the 1.6T VCSEL ramp management placed in "the second half of this year"; the CPO
large-order ramp at "end of the year into next year"; OCS capacity post-bottleneck; and the industrial
recovery led by semi-cap orders.
It is a multiple statement as much as an estimate statement. At the median of COHR's own five-year history the multiple roughly halves and the target falls far below spot. The +21.9% depends on COHR holding the 85th–91st percentile of its own valuation range for another year. That is the "multiple late-cycle" half of §1 restated in target form, and a reader should treat the revenue path as the well-evidenced part and the multiple as the assumption.
No external professional target was available for a sanity band on this name. Recorded as absent rather than substituted.
Vehicle: EQUITY. Ladder rung 1. No argument required, and none is offered.
| Required disclosure | Value |
|---|---|
| Trailing 252-day realised volatility | 80.5% |
| Implied volatility, ATM 12–18 month calls | 93.0–94.5% |
| IV − RV | +12.5 to +14.0 points |
| Quoted size at the specific strike | $220 strike, 2027-12-17: 28 × 32 contracts, bid $93.74 / ask $99.82, open interest 18 |
| Deeper strike | $220 strike, 2028-01-21: 149 × 147, OI 37 |
| Equity liquidity | $43.5bn market cap, S&P 500 constituent — ample for any size this book would take |
Why not a LEAP. A 12.5–14.0 point implied-over-realised premium, paid for 17 months, on a name whose 12-month target is +21.9%. The $220 December-2027 strike carries 18 contracts of open interest and a 6.1-point bid-ask spread (6.3% of premium) — the framework's own record notes HCA at 18 contracts and CRDO at 78 as uninvestable. The January-2028 strike is deeper (149×147) but extends the premium to 18 months. Equity.
| Criteria | Score |
|---|---|
| Momentum | Assessed cross-sectionally: COHR at 91st percentile of its own 5y multiple history; spot $222.19 against the screen's $243.18 tick on 2026-07-28 (−8.6% in one session). Positive 12-1 momentum, negative very-short-term. Governs entry timing only. |
| Catalyst | Q4/FY2026 results ~mid-August 2026 with the first FY2027 guide — the single highest-information event. See calendar. |
| Consensus | INDETERMINATE. AV EARNINGS_ESTIMATES returns zero rows for this name (§6 of research). A quota or coverage gap leaves this blank and blocks nothing. |
| Short Mechanism | Not present. Growth is accelerating (+17.3% → +17.5% → +20.5%) and margin runway is not exhausted (non-GAAP 19.9% actual → 21.3% guided). Fails both legs. |
| Peer Spread | Named peer APH (interconnect components, same end-market). COHR 6.70x EV/Sales vs APH 6.56x — near parity, while APH grows 3x faster and earns 2.6x the margin. COHR is expensive relative to APH on fundamentals, at parity on the headline multiple. |
| Sub-sector | Optical & Photonics / AI interconnect. |
| Company state | B — cyclical, dated as early-cycle earnings / late-cycle multiple |
| Terminal EBIT margin | 20.0%, from own non-GAAP 19.9% actual and 21.3% guided, bridged through opex |
| Exit multiple | 15.0x derived; peer-derived UNIDENTIFIED (n=1 matched); flip 23.6x |
| Required 5y revenue CAGR | 29.18% |
| Demonstrated | 18.0% TTM YoY (10.9% 3y CAGR) |
| Margin | −11.18pp |
| Implied multiple compression | 65.2x → 15.0x, −77.0% |
| Valuation Criteria | FAIL |
| 12-month target | $271, +21.9% |
| Vehicle | Equity; IV − RV +12.5 to +14.0pp |
| Evidence grade | B |