CRM · investment memo
Evidenced, not asserted. GAAP operating margin ran 2.1% (FY22) -> 3.3% -> 14.4% -> 19.0% -> 20.1% (FY26) -> 20.4% TTM; the expansion has visibly flattened at +1.4pp across the last two years. 24% assumes +3.6pp over five years, roughly the observed pace of the last two continued, and well short of closing the gap to the 34.8% non-GAAP margin which caps the plausible range. ABOVE the trailing actual of 20.4%, so the below-trailing error class does not apply. Constraint m_EBIT,T 24.0 <= m_gross,T 76.9 SATISFIED (total gross margin 76.9%, flat year on year per Research; the SUBSCRIPTION gross margin is compressing and is the metric the memo flags to watch).
Four distinct questions, one field each. A price is not a thesis: the trigger below forces a re-underwrite and freezes further purchases — it is never an automatic sell.
A daily close below $163.09 triggers a mandatory re-underwrite and freezes further purchases. It is not an automatic sell unless a separate fundamental invalidation condition has been breached.
Not stated. This name has no falsifiable invalidation conditions on file, so it cannot be risk-monitored. That is a gap in the research, not a clean bill of health — recorded rather than hidden.
Type: MEASURED. Logged, scored, and it does not reject the name. Scenario — consumption transition compresses revenue per customer while the balance sheet is levered. Probability 25%. Named cause and mechanism. Salesforce is deliberately migrating from per-seat to consumption pricing (28.6trn tokens processed, Agentic Work Units as the unit of account, "consumption" mentions up from zero two years ago). In every historical software pricing transition the transitional period compresses revenue per customer before it expands it, because the new meter is sold at a discount to win the migration. S