Intuit [INTU]
As of 2026-07-29. Spot $333.13. Two outputs, per references/valuation.md: a 12-month target and the
five-year implied-path test.
STATE A — mature and structurally stable. Confirmed by test.
Evidence. Profitable for 20+ consecutive years. GAAP operating margin 20.2% → 21.9% → 22.3% → 26.1% → 27.5% TTM across five fiscal years — a 7.3pp range, monotonically improving. No transformative acquisition (nothing closed in FY2026). No business-model transition: the DIY-to-assisted shift is a mix change inside an existing product. The August-2025 segment recast is a reporting change with prior periods recast to conform, so there is no accounting-basis break.
The seasonality question, answered. Tax season is a within-year seasonal, not a multi-year exogenous cycle, so Intuit is not State B. State B exists for names whose revenue or margin is set by fab utilisation, memory pricing or a commodity input, where a trailing peak margin paired with a cycle-average growth forecast is internally inconsistent. The 47.0% margin printed in the April quarter is not a cycle peak; it is April. The correct handling — used throughout — is matched-fiscal-period comparison and a TTM window spanning one full seasonal cycle.
Consequence: the reverse DCF is the primary long-horizon instrument; the terminal margin is built from Intuit's own normalised economics plus a forward bridge, with industry data as a sanity band only. Evidence grade A — 81 quarterly periods of normalized statements plus ten quarters of transcripts.
| Input | Value | Source and check |
|---|---|---|
| Spot | $333.13 | 2026-07-29 close, Alpaca |
| Diluted shares | 276.3m | Verified against filed EPS, not taken from a vendor: Q3 FY26 net income $3,064m ÷ GAAP diluted EPS $11.09 (stated on the call) = 276.3m. AV's commonStockSharesOutstanding of 276m agrees. Not dual-class, so the WDAY dei failure mode does not apply; no split in the series. |
| Market cap | $92,043m | |
| Cash + investments | $6,956m | Cash $4,681m + investments $2,099m (balance sheet) + long-term investments $176m |
| Total debt | $6,162m | Short-term debt $750m (balance sheet) + long-term debt $5,412m |
| Net cash (used) | +$794m | Excludes $1,393m of operating-lease liabilities ($655m non-current + current). Treating leases as debt gives −$599m; both disclosed. |
| EV | $91,249m | |
| TTM revenue | $20,925m | Four quarterly periods ending 2026-04-30, 2026-01-31, 2025-10-31, 2025-07-31 — one complete seasonal cycle. Last fiscal year alone (FY2025, $18,831m) would understate the base by 11.1%. |
| TTM gross profit | $16,955m (81.0%) | |
| TTM GAAP EBIT | $5,748m (27.47%) | Prior-year matched TTM: $4,433m / 24.4%. Rising 3.1pp. |
| EV / TTM sales | 4.36x | |
| EV / TTM GAAP EBIT | 15.9x |
AV defect found and rejected: AV reports shortTermDebt of $833m against the filed $750m — an $83m
overstatement that propagates into net cash. The filed figure is used. AV's
sellingGeneralAndAdministrative again carries G&A only ($1,656m TTM against $7,901m of S&M + G&A — 4.77x);
S&M is derived as operatingExpenses − R&D − G&A. See INTU_Financial_Model_Notes.md.
| TTM $m | % of revenue | |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 20,925 | 100.0% |
| Gross profit | 16,955 | 81.02% |
| Sales & marketing (derived) | (6,245) | (29.85%) |
| Research & development | (3,320) | (15.87%) |
| General & administrative | (1,656) | (7.91%) |
| GAAP operating income | 5,748 | 27.47% |
Prior-year matched TTM operating margin: 24.4%. Three years ago (TTM to 2023-04-30): 21.7%. Intuit has expanded its GAAP operating margin 5.8pp in three years on matched periods.
| Terminal | TTM actual | Reasoning | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gross margin | 80.5% | 81.02% | Taken DOWN 0.5pp — deliberately, against the trend. TurboTax Live is human-expert delivered and sits in cost of revenue; it is 53% of TurboTax revenue, up 11 points in one year, growing 36%, and management calls assisted "88% of the TAM." QuickBooks Capital adds credit provisions. A rising gross margin (79% → 80.5% → 81.0% over three years) is being underwritten as flat-to-slightly-down because the named mix shift runs the other way. |
| Sales & marketing | (26.0%) | (29.85%) | The 2026 Plan cuts 17% of the workforce, explicitly targeting "coordination-heavy roles — PMO, biz ops, some product management and design", with $300–340m of charges in Q4 FY2026 and completion by Q1 FY2027. 3.9pp of leverage over five years on a business whose largest S&M item is tax-season advertising against a flat unit base. |
| Research & development | (15.0%) | (15.87%) | Modest leverage only. Intuit is not reducing technology investment — savings are being redeployed into "assisted tax, money and mid market." |
| General & administrative | (6.5%) | (7.91%) | Direct target of the delayering. |
| Terminal GAAP operating margin | 33.0% | 27.47% |
m_EBIT,T ≤ m_gross,T: 33.0% ≤ 80.5%. Satisfied with 47.5pp of headroom.33.0% GAAP ≈ 44% non-GAAP − ~9.5% SBC − ~1.5% amortisation. TTM SBC is
approximately $2.05bn, 9.8% of revenue — roughly 6.6pp lower than ServiceNow's 16.4% and already near the
terminal assumption, so the SBC leg here requires almost nothing. FY2025 non-GAAP operating margin was ~39%;
Q3 FY26 non-GAAP operating income was $4.7bn on $8.558bn. Reaching ~44% by FY2031 is 5pp of expansion over
five years, against 5.8pp already delivered in three.Prose justification. Intuit's terminal operating margin is 33.0% because the company has demonstrated 5.8pp of GAAP operating-margin expansion over three matched-period years, is executing a sized and dated 17% workforce reduction whose savings are partly redeployed and partly retained, and carries SBC at 9.8% of revenue — already close to steady state, so unlike ServiceNow there is no large SBC assumption doing hidden work. The gross-margin leg is set BELOW the trailing actual and against the three-year trend, because the growth engine (assisted tax, 53% of TurboTax revenue and rising) is human-delivered and lands in cost of revenue. That single conservatism is the honest core of this build: Intuit is getting more profitable at the operating line while its revenue mix gets less profitable at the gross line, and the terminal margin reflects both.
Contrast with the NOW build, deliberately. NOW's 23.0% requires SBC to fall from 16.4% to under 10% — a company-published commitment, but a 6.9pp swing doing most of the work. Intuit's 33.0% requires SBC to move 0.3pp. Intuit's terminal margin has far less parameter risk in it.
EV_T / EBIT_T = (1−t)(1−g/ROIC) / (WACC−g)
| t | g | ROIC | WACC | Warranted EV/EBIT |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.24 | 4.0% | 22% | 10.0% | 10.4x |
| 0.24 | 4.0% | 22% | 9.0% | 12.4x |
| 0.24 | 4.5% | 22% | 8.5% | 15.1x |
| 0.24 | 4.0% | 30% | 9.0% | 13.2x |
ROIC is Intuit's actual measured 22.0% ($4,369m NOPAT ÷ $19,835m invested capital) — not an estimate and not an organic proxy, because Intuit's invested capital is not distorted by recent M&A.
Base: 12.5x — the identity at (WACC 9%, g 4%, ROIC 22%). The same base is used on NOW, so the two names are compared on identical terms.
Growth-matched anchoring check. Intuit's growth at the exit year is ~9–11% (decelerating from 14.0% nine-month / 10.4% latest matched quarter). The mature-software comparator set from the enterprise-software cluster memo spans 7.0%–20.6% latest-quarter growth and brackets it: ADBE 11.6x · ORCL 14.9x · INTU 15.9x · MSFT 18.8x · CRM 20.8x · VEEV 27.7x, median 17.5x. Admissible, so UNIDENTIFIED is not declared.
The important observation. Intuit trades at 15.9x today. The identity at a 9% WACC gives 12.4x; at an 8.5% WACC and 4.5% terminal growth it gives 15.1x. Intuit's current multiple is roughly what the reinvestment identity warrants at a modest cost of capital — the market is not paying a premium for this business. That is the opposite of NOW, which trades at 27.2x on a non-GAAP basis against the same identity.
Implied compression at the 12.5x base: from 15.9x today, −21.4%.
Solved for: revenue CAGR. Held fixed: terminal margin 33.0%, exit multiple 12.5x EV/EBIT, WACC 10.0%, 5 years, revenue base $20,925m, net cash $794m, 276.3m diluted shares.
| Window | Basis | CAGR |
|---|---|---|
| 5-year TTM | $8,888m (TTM to 2021-04-30) → $20,925m | 18.7% |
| 3-year TTM | $14,070m (TTM to 2023-04-30) → $20,925m | 14.2% |
| 9M FY26 vs 9M FY25, matched | $15,000m → $17,094m | 14.0% — the screen's figure |
| Latest matched quarter | Q3 FY26 vs Q3 FY25 | 10.4% |
Demonstrated is taken as 14.2% (three-year TTM). Note the five-year figure is inflated by the post-COVID Mailchimp and Credit Karma acquisitions and by the tax-season timing distortions of FY2021, and the most recent matched quarter is 10.4% — so 14.2% is the generous-but-defensible middle, and the deceleration is a real risk to it.
Required revenue CAGR: 11.2%. Demonstrated: 14.2%. Margin = demonstrated − required = +3.0pp. Valuation Criteria: PASS.
Not "PASS WITH ARGUMENT" — the price requires less than the business has already demonstrated, so no forward argument is needed. Note the margin is only +3.0pp, which sits at the edge of the ±3pp noise band the cluster memo established. Read it as a genuine but narrow pass.
Required 5-year revenue CAGR. PASS where the cell is ≤ 14.2%.
| Terminal margin | 9.0x | 11.0x | 12.5x | 13.0x | 15.9x | 17.5x | 20.8x |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 27.5% — no expansion at all | 23.2% | 18.3% | — | 14.5% | 9.9% | 7.9% | 4.2% |
| 30.0% | 21.1% | 16.3% | — | 12.5% | 8.0% | 6.0% | 2.4% |
| 33.0% — base | 18.8% | 14.1% | 11.2% | 10.4% | 6.0% | 4.0% | 0.5% |
| 36.0% | 16.7% | 12.1% | — | 8.5% | 4.2% | 2.2% | −1.3% |
Intuit PASSes at every exit multiple from 11.0x upward at the base terminal margin, and at 13.0x upward even with ZERO margin expansion from today. It fails only below ~10x exit. That is a materially more robust result than NOW's, which fails everywhere below 20.8x.
| Question | Answer |
|---|---|
| At the demonstrated 14.2% CAGR and my 33.0% terminal margin, what exit multiple does today's price require? | 11.0x EV/EBIT — 4.9x below the 15.9x Intuit trades at today and 1.5x below the identity at a 9% WACC. |
| At the demonstrated 14.2% CAGR and a 12.5x exit, what terminal margin does today's price require? | 28.9% — only 1.4pp above Intuit's own trailing actual of 27.47%, and 4.1pp below my build. Intuit has already delivered 5.8pp of expansion in three years. |
Both flip points sit inside what the company has already done. That is what a clean PASS looks like.
The screen recorded required −1.1% against demonstrated 14.0%, a +15.1pp margin. From the grid, a required CAGR near zero occurs at roughly a 21x exit multiple. The screen's +15.1pp was manufactured by an exit multiple around 21x — 8.5x above the identity's 12.5x.
And a negative required CAGR is itself the tell. The brief flags negative required growth rates as a symptom of the wrong instrument or the wrong parameter, not of a 15pp-cheap name. Required growth of −1.1% says the price is covered even if Intuit shrinks — which is arithmetically true at 21x and economically not a claim anyone should underwrite.
My +3.0pp is the defensible figure: a PASS, 12.1pp narrower than the screen's, on the same direction.
NTM base, on matched fiscal periods. NTM from 2026-07-29 is essentially fiscal 2027 (Aug 2026 – Jul 2027).
| Period | $m | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| 9M FY2026 actual | 17,094 | filed |
| Q4 FY2026 estimate | ~4,330 | Q4 FY2025 was $3,831m; +13%, consistent with the raised full-year guide |
| FY2026 revenue | ~21,424 | |
| FY2027 = NTM revenue | ~24,000 | +12% — below the 14.0% nine-month rate, reflecting the Q3 deceleration to 10.4% and guided total online paying units of +2% |
| NTM GAAP EBIT at 29.0% | ~6,960 | 27.47% TTM plus the 2026 Plan benefit; the $300–340m charge lands in Q4 FY2026, outside the NTM window |
Multiple, anchored on Intuit's own history with the percentile stated.
Quarterly EV/EBIT computed from filed TTM EBIT, the filed balance sheet, and the price ~45 days after each period end. Window: the 18 quarters from 2022-04-30 — the post-ZIRP rate regime. The FY2021 observations (50x–72x) are excluded as a different cost-of-capital regime.
| EV/TTM EBIT | |
|---|---|
| Window minimum (2026-04-30) | 13.4x |
| Window 25th percentile | ~43x |
| Window median | 47.7x |
| Window maximum (2024-10-31) | 53.6x |
| Current, at spot | 15.9x — the 6th percentile of the window |
| Target anchor | 20.0x — the 8th percentile of the window |
$6,960m × 20.0x = EV $139,200m + net cash $794m = equity $139,994m ÷ 276.3m = $507/share.
12-month target: $507. +52.2% to spot.
Why 20.0x and not the 47.7x median. A reversion to the median gives $1,207 (+262%), which is not a forecast — it is an arithmetic restatement of how far the stock has fallen. Intuit's EV/EBIT went 48.9x (2025-04-30) → 37.6x → 35.9x → 24.3x → 15.9x in fifteen months while operating margin rose from 24.4% to 27.5%. That is a pure multiple event — rates plus the priced risk that general-purpose AI agents disintermediate DIY tax and SMB bookkeeping — and there is no evidence it fully reverses inside twelve months. 20.0x is a partial recovery, sitting only 4.1x above spot and still 4.4pp below the identity-warranted 15.1x-at-8.5%-WACC upper case expressed on the same basis, justified by three named, dated items: the 2026 Plan's $300–340m charge clearing in Q4 FY2026 with the savings accruing in FY2027; TurboTax Live at 53% of TurboTax revenue growing 36% into the FY2027 season; and Credit Karma at +21.5% with a documented 54% increase in filings originating in Credit Karma.
Sensitivity. At today's 15.9x the target is $403 (+21.0%); at 25.0x it is $633 (+90.0%).
The caveat that matters. Spot rose 17.1% in the five sessions to 2026-07-29 ($284.47 → $333.13), and the 252-day range is $255.07 – $807.39 — spot is 58.7% below the high. The 6th-percentile reading is measured at the top of a violent bounce off a multi-year low; a week earlier the same calculation gave the 3rd percentile. I do not have a sourced cause for the five-session move and will not invent one.
No external professional target was obtained inside the time box, so the mandated sanity-band comparison is not performed — stated rather than substituted for.
| Criteria | Type | Verdict | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quality | BINDING | PASS | COMPOUNDER. ROIC 22.0% vs ~9–10% WACC with an evidenced redeployment mechanism (mid-market capacity +30% on "favorable LTV to CAC"). Gross margin 81.0%. DSO 8.9 days, no receivable build. Operating margin +5.8pp in three matched years. F-score not computed — INDETERMINATE. |
| Valuation | BINDING | PASS | Required 11.2% vs demonstrated 14.2%. Margin +3.0pp — a genuine but narrow pass, at the edge of the ±3pp noise band. PASSes at every exit multiple ≥11.0x at base, and ≥13.0x with zero margin expansion. |
| Liquidity | BINDING | PASS on the equity; the options chain FAILS | See INTU_Trade_Construction.md. Max open interest near the money on the Jan-2027 chain is 356 contracts. |
| Downside | MEASURED | Logged | Structural DIY unit decline; $210, −37%, p=25%. |
| Catalyst | MEASURED | Logged | See INTU_Catalyst_Calendar.md. |
| Momentum | MEASURED | Unresolved | −58.7% from the 252-day high; +17.1% in five sessions. Realised vol 48.4%. |
| Consensus | MEASURED | INDETERMINATE | EARNINGS_ESTIMATES returned estimates: [] for INTU despite premium entitlement. No revision history. Blocks nothing. |
| Peer Spread | MEASURED | Logged | INTU 15.9x EV/EBIT on a 27.5% operating margin vs ADBE 11.6x on 36.1%, CRM 20.8x on 20.4%, NOW 27.2x on a 30.2% non-GAAP margin. Own EV/EBIT percentile 6th (post-2022 window, median 47.7x). |
| Short Mechanism | MEASURED | PARTIALLY triggers — recorded | Growth is decelerating on matched periods (18.3% → 17.4% → 10.4%) and the largest revenue line is losing units. But the margin runway is not exhausted — a 17% headcount cut is still to land and the margin has expanded 5.8pp in three years. The test needs both; it gets one. Acted on by nothing on this fork. |
| Sub-sector | MEASURED | Enterprise/SMB software — fintech-adjacent (payments, lending) |