iRhythm [IRTC] — Trade Construction & Liquidity Criteria
No position verdict is issued here.
1. Liquidity Criteria — PASS (equity), FAIL (options at any size)
Spot
$122.23 (2026-07-29 close)
Market cap
$4,016m
Shares outstanding
32.854m (filed BS, 31 Mar 2026); 32.507m WA diluted Q1-2026
20-day average volume (IEX feed)
38,418 shares → ~$4.7m IEX notional
Consolidated $ADV (IEX ~2–3% of tape)
~$150–235m/day, estimated — flagged as an estimate
Bar recency
last daily bar 2026-07-29 — liveness asserted (§9.4)
Corporate actions
no 8-K/Form 25/Form 15 indicating a transaction. $25.0m treasury stock (229k shares) held.
Equity liquidity is adequate. Note the small share count (32.9m) — a large position is a meaningful
percentage of the float, and the $650.3m converts are a potential future share-count event (see §3).
2. Vehicle ladder — rung 1, EQUITY
Chosen vehicle: common equity. Ladder position 1. No argument required.
Required disclosure, whatever the vehicle
Implied volatility minus trailing realised volatility, as a number:
Quoted size at the specific strike — this is the disqualifying measurement:
Contract
bid × size
ask × size
mid
spread
IV
delta
IRTC 2027-01-15 C125
15.60 × 9
19.62 × 13
17.61
$4.02 = 22.8% of mid
53.8%
0.569
IRTC 2027-01-15 C120
18.37 × 8
21.80 × 8
20.09
17.1% of mid
54.7%
0.613
IRTC 2027-01-15 C130
14.58 × 10
17.38 × 12
15.98
17.5% of mid
54.8%
0.529
Why the answer is equity, on three independent grounds
A vehicle that cannot be filled is not a vehicle. Quoted depth at the ATM strike is 9 × 13
contracts — nominally ~$110k–160k of underlying exposure. This reproduces the HCA (18 contracts) and GMED
(13 contracts) failure mode exactly. Chain-level open interest is equally thin: the entire Jan-2027 call chain
peaks at 50 contracts (at the $175 strike), Feb-2027 peaks at 0, Mar-2027 at 2.
Chain depth is not strike depth, and here neither is present.
Horizon conflict, named rather than silently resolved. Jan-2027 is 5.5 months out — shorter than the
declared 12-month thesis horizon, so it sits on rung 3 and would require a catalyst before expiry. The
catalyst that matters (CY2027 PFS final rule, ~1 Nov 2026) does precede a Jan-2027 expiry, so the
catalyst test would pass — but the constructability test fails outright, and no longer expiry exists with any
depth. Per criteria.md: "Where no expiry is both liquid and long enough, the answer is equity."
The premium. +9.9 points of implied over realised, plus a 22.8% round-trip spread at the strike.
Multi-leg (rung 4) is unconstructable. A Jan-2027 vertical would need a short leg at a higher strike; the
deepest strike in the chain quotes ~50 contracts of open interest and single-digit quoted size. This is the
FCEL failure (12-contract short leg) rather than the TE failure (constructable but capped where the thesis pays).
3. The convertible notes — a share-count consideration the vehicle choice must respect
$650.313m carrying value of senior convertible notes sit ahead of the equity. Interest expense is $3.290m/quarter
(~$13.2m/yr, ~2.0% cash coupon), so there is no funding cliff. But:
Against 32.854m shares, conversion is a material dilution event. The conversion price was not extracted from
the filings in this run and is therefore not asserted — it is a named open item, not an estimate.
The relevance to the vehicle: a long call position would be exposed to conversion-driven dilution capping the
upside, on top of an unfillable chain. Equity at least participates in the same economics as the converts'
reference security.
The Valuation section's net-debt figure (−$100.7m) uses carrying value, not the if-converted share count.
Stated so the basis travels with the number.
4. Position construction, if the book elects one
The Valuation Criteria returns FAIL on the 5-year implied path, while the 12-month target is +40.8%. That
is a genuine horizon split, not a contradiction, and the book — not this memo — resolves it.
Entry discipline: the dominant dated event is the CY2027 PFS final rule (~1 Nov 2026). Entering ahead of
it is a bet on a rate outcome; entering after it removes the largest single variance source. Given the rate has
just risen 7.8% and CMS has proposed a further increase for CY2027 (reported, not verified — see Catalyst
Calendar), the skew is arguably favourable, but it is a policy coin-flip and should be sized as one.
Invalidation gap: a CY2027 final rule cutting 93247 materially, or any DOJ escalation from CID to
complaint/intervention, invalidates the thesis. Both are observable and dated.
Sizing input: inverse-volatility at 43.9% realised vol places IRTC in a mid-size bucket — larger
than DOCS's (57.0%). This is the wrong answer and the reason must be recorded: IRTC carries a genuine
fat left tail (FCA treble damages plus per-claim penalties, and net debt) that 43.9% vol does not capture,
while DOCS's left tail is cushioned by $748.6m of net cash. This is the HALO defect precisely — inverse-vol
sizing mispriced a fat left tail at only 30% vol. IRTC should be sized below what inverse-vol prescribes,
and the override should be explicit in the book rather than applied through a hidden haircut to the valuation
(valuation.md rule 5: uncertainty reduces position size, never the operating assumption).
Exposure tags: sub-sector MedTech (cardiac diagnostics). No overlap with DOCS (HCIT), so the two
names in this pair do not compete on a concentration limit — but IRTC does correlate with the covered
diagnostics complex (TEM, NTRA, GH, WGS) through the shared reimbursement-policy factor, which is a
correlation the book should treat as a single risk rather than four.
5. Short Mechanism Criteria (MEASURED)
Neither leg present. Growth accelerating (20.3% → 25.7% on the Q1 comparison); margin runway abundant
(operating margin −8.1%, gross margin 70.9%, SG&A 68.2% of revenue with 7.4pp/yr of demonstrated leverage). There
is no short mechanism here. Recorded.