Ondas [ONDS]
as of 2026-07-29 · spot $6.80 (SIP close) · no position verdict is issued here
| Feed | 20-day ADV (shares) | 20-day $ADV |
|---|---|---|
| IEX | 1,971,682 | $14.6m |
| SIP | 110,682,196 | $815.4m |
| actual ratio | 56.1x | |
| The brief's 20x rule would have given | 39,433,640 | $290m — −64% |
On ONDS the 20x IEX multiplier understates true volume by 64%. SIP was entitled and used directly. Recorded for the calibration file alongside OUST (35.9x) and ASTS (38.1x): the true IEX share of consolidated volume on these three names is 1.8%–2.8%, not 5%.
| Metric | Value (SIP) |
|---|---|
| ADV 20-day | 110,682,196 shares · $815.4m/day |
| ADV 60-day | 86,601,142 shares · $785.0m/day |
| 252-day realised volatility | 122.7% |
| 52-week range | $1.82 – $14.01; spot at 48.5% of the high |
| 50-day / 200-day MA | $8.91 / $9.34 — spot is below both |
$815m of daily dollar volume on a $3.4bn market capitalisation means roughly 24% of the company changes hands every day. That is not liquidity in the ordinary sense; it is a name whose float is dominated by short-horizon flow. It passes the Criteria trivially — a $10m position is 1.2% of one day — but the character of the liquidity is a risk in itself: turnover of that order is usually retail and momentum flow, and it leaves as fast as it arrives. Spot is already below both moving averages.
Active chain, 2026-09-01 to 2027-07-01 (282 contracts):
| Expiry | Contracts | Total OI | Max OI at one strike |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-04 | 48 | 556 | 124 |
| 2026-09-18 | 54 | 280,415 | 46,301 |
| 2026-12-18 | 54 | 102,890 | 12,743 |
| 2027-01-15 | 64 | 411,719 | 81,453 |
| 2027-03-19 | 38 | 13,693 | 2,153 |
| 2027-06-17 | 24 | 18,233 | 5,053 |
Jan-2027 snapshot (2026-07-29):
| Type | Strike | OI | Bid | Ask | Spread as % of mid | Bid sz | Ask sz | IV | Delta |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Call | 5.0 | 5,781 | 2.68 | 2.96 | 9.9% | 1,729 | 3,023 | 1.18 | 0.78 |
| Call | 7.5 | 22,970 | 1.68 | 1.87 | 10.7% | 1,319 | 3,189 | 1.13 | 0.60 |
| Call | 9.0 | 10,687 | 1.25 | 1.49 | 17.5% | 2,623 | 3,352 | 1.12 | 0.51 |
| Call | 10.0 | 50,077 | 1.11 | 1.24 | 11.1% | 230 | 2,835 | 1.12 | 0.45 |
| Call | 12.0 | 18,959 | 0.78 | 0.94 | 18.6% | 275 | 3,736 | 1.12 | 0.36 |
| Put | 5.0 | 5,441 | 0.83 | 0.89 | 7.0% | 1,177 | 361 | 1.04 | −0.22 |
| Put | 7.5 | 8,440 | 2.18 | 2.37 | 8.4% | 1,758 | 543 | 1.02 | −0.42 |
| Put | 4.0 | 4,652 | 0.39 | 0.51 | 26.7% | 1,951 | 2,414 | 1.03 | −0.13 |
The brief's expectation — that chains on names this size are uninvestable — is decisively false here. 411,719 contracts of open interest in one expiry, 50,077 at a single strike, quoted sizes in the thousands, and spreads of 7–11% of mid at the liquid strikes, which is tighter than OUST's 12–22%.
Implied volatility 102%–118% against 252-day realised of 122.7% — a ratio of 0.83x to 0.96x, i.e. options are priced BELOW realised volatility. That is the opposite of the usual small-cap pattern and it is the strongest argument in this cluster for expressing a view in options rather than stock.
If a book wanted to own the upside, the structurally cheapest expression is the Jan-2027 $7.50/$12.00 call
spread: pay 1.87, sell 0.78, net 1.09 for a $4.50 maximum payoff (4.1:1), break-even $8.59, open
interest 22,970 / 18,959, both quoted in thousands. If a book wanted the downside, the Jan-2027 $5.00 put at
0.89 (IV 1.04, OI 5,441, 7.0% spread) costs 13.1% of spot for a strike 26% below, and the payoff funds itself if
the cash floor of $2.73 (ONDS_Valuation.md §5.2) is ever tested.
Both structures are stated as executable. Neither is recommended — the memo issues no verdict. The point is that on ONDS, unusually, the vehicle question has a real answer: options are cheap relative to realised volatility and the chain is deep enough to fill.
| 252-day realised volatility | 122.7% |
| Inverse-vol scalar vs a 32% reference | 0.26x |
| Indicative size on a book that would otherwise carry 4% | ~1.0% |
Volatility, not liquidity, constrains size — as on OUST. But there is a second constraint the framework does not capture with a scalar: the share count is growing at roughly 25% a quarter. A position held for a year is diluted by an issuer that has issued ~$1.83bn of equity in fourteen months and has an unlimited S-3ASR. Any sizing decision should treat the position as decaying, not static.
| Level | Value | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Spot | $6.80 | SIP close 2026-07-29 |
| 50-day MA | $8.91 | spot −23.7% below |
| 200-day MA | $9.34 | spot −27.2% below — both moving averages are lost |
| 2026-03-31 balance-sheet-date price | $9.04 | spot −24.8% |
| Net cash per share | $2.15 | corrected net cash $1,152.5m (after the $200m High Point cash) ÷ 535.8m shares. The hard floor |
| Net cash per share from 2027-01-04 | $1.98 | ÷ 580.8m once the High Point Locked-Up Shares are delivered |
| Net cash per fully diluted share | $1.30 | ÷ 886.4m |
| 52-week low | $1.82 | |
| Invalidation for a long | there is no intact trend structure to invalidate | The name is below both moving averages already. The next reference level down is the net-cash floor at $2.73 |
| Invalidation for the negative research view | a quarter with no acquisitions in which the 49% gross margin holds and operating expenses fall in absolute dollars | That would evidence integration and convert the roll-up narrative into an operating one |
Momentum Criteria (MEASURED, timing only): 12-1 momentum +340.7% — among the highest in the universe. And simultaneously: −28.3% over three months, −15.2% over one month, below both moving averages, 48.5% of the 52-week high. The 12-month tape and the 3-month tape are in violent disagreement. The criterion governs when, and its answer is that the turn has already happened.
Named cause: a roll-up whose currency stops working.
The mechanism is specific and it is already partly visible. Ondas acquires Israeli defence-technology businesses using cash raised by selling equity and warrants, plus shares issued directly to vendors (Bird Aerosystems: 10,291,207 shares; 4M: 1,154,036 shares; "other immaterial": $4.8m in equity). The currency is the share price.
| Scenario | Probability | Outcome | Cause |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bear — permanent impairment | 40% | $2.15 (−68%) | Acquisitions stop (currency too weak); the acquired revenue base does not grow organically; opex does not fall because the cost base was purchased with the revenue; goodwill impairs. The business converges on its net cash. Not insolvency — $1.15bn of net cash against a $43m quarterly operating loss is roughly 6–7 years of runway |
| Base | 40% | $3.95 (−42%) | Net cash plus ~10x TTM revenue. Roll-up continues at a slower pace; integration is partial; multiple compresses further from the 0th percentile of a meaningless history |
| Bull | 20% | $7.78 (+14%) | Optimus and Iron Drone Raider scale organically; a second Sentrycs-scale contributor emerges; the market re-rates to the lowest multiple in the name's own history (31.2x) |
Going-concern case: argued and rejected. $1.153bn of corrected net cash against a $42.7m quarterly operating loss. Ondas is not going to run out of money; it is going to run out of currency. Those are different risks and only the second one is live.
The 40% bear weight is a judgement input, not an output, logged for Brier scoring per criteria.md. It is
higher than the 30% used on OUST for one specific reason: the bear case here requires nothing to go wrong. It
only requires the acquisitions to stop, and the acquisitions are funded by a currency that has already halved.
Ondas is an eighteen-month-old, twelve-acquisition Israeli defence-technology roll-up with ~$42m of estimated organic revenue, no disclosed backlog of any kind, an operating loss widening from $10m to $43m a quarter, one reportable segment, $694m of preliminary purchase accounting, $1.15bn of net cash, a $1.06bn warrant liability, 886m fully diluted shares against a 496m cover count, and a reported EPS of $0.58 that is entirely a derivative mark.
The price requires 77% to 140% compound revenue growth for five years. The evidenced organic driver is $11.4m of year-on-year growth from two named products at one subsidiary.
Quality Criteria FAIL · Valuation Criteria FAIL · Liquidity Criteria PASS · momentum says the turn has happened. Two of three BINDING Criteria fail. The book decides.