Phase Space AI

Valuation

Progress Software [PRGS]

Progress Software [PRGS] — Valuation

As of 2026-07-30 · spot $40.01 · Company state: A (mature-stable)


1. Base figures

Shares outstanding 41,012,942 (dei cover, 26 Jun 2026)
Market capitalisation $1,640.9m
Net debt (carrying) $1,189.169m
Enterprise value (lease-exclusive) $2,830.1m
Enterprise value (lease-inclusive, +$34.611m) $2,864.7m
TTM revenue (to 31 May 2026) $1,003.725m
TTM operating income (GAAP) $178.600m
TTM operating margin 17.79%
TTM free cash flow $305.221m (30.41% margin)
EV / Sales 2.82x
EV / EBIT 15.85x
EV / FCF 9.27x

TTM FCF margin is positive, so per DATA_DEFECTS.md the interim-FCF correction moves in the conservative direction; omitting it would have overstated required CAGR. --fcf-margin 0.3041 was passed explicitly. No forward-guidance basis exists that would flip the sign (capex is $8.5m/yr).


2. Terminal margin — 18.0%

Basis: the company's own TTM demonstrated GAAP operating margin of 17.79%, rounded up to 18.0%.

Opex bridge from 10-K lines (FY2025, % of $977.831m revenue)

Line $m % rev
Gross profit 790.250 80.82%
less Product development (R&D) 192.265 19.66%
less Selling & marketing 211.013 21.58%
less General & administrative 108.215 11.07%
less Amortisation of acquired intangibles (opex) 104.266 10.66%
less Restructuring 13.109 1.34%
less Acquisition-related and other 8.092 0.83%
= Operating income 153.290 15.68%

Ties to the filed OperatingIncomeLoss of $153,290,000 exactly. Constraint satisfied: m_EBIT,T 18.0% ≤ m_gross,T 80.8%.

Why 18.0% and not higher

The 22.4pp gap between the 80.8% gross margin and the 15.7% FY2025 operating margin is real operating cost, and 12.83pp of it (amortisation of acquired intangibles + acquisition costs) is structurally permanent for this business: PRGS's organic revenue declines, so it must keep acquiring, so the amortisation is replenished rather than run off. FY2024 amortisation was 12.5% of revenue; FY2025 was 14.88%. It is rising, not decaying.

A terminal margin built by adding back that amortisation — the non-GAAP ~40% — would assume PRGS stops acquiring and keeps growing. Those are mutually exclusive on this name's own numbers.

The four most recent quarters print 15.2%, 17.6%, 19.9%, 18.5%. 18.0% is the centre of that band and +2.3pp above the FY2025 annual actual — it is not below the trailing figure, which the brief flags as almost always an error.

steady_state_check.py --ticker PRGS --terminal-margin 0.18 --exit-multiple 15.85 --wacc 0.095

MARGIN RAMP
  2020-11-30 margin      24.4%
  latest margin          15.7%
  moved                  -8.7pp   latest is window peak: False
  terminal assumed       18.0%   (+2.3pp vs latest, -6.4pp vs peak)

RETURNS AND THE WARRANTED MULTIPLE
  ROIC measured                                   7.3%
  warranted multiple at steady ROIC               7.2x
  SCALING CONTAMINATION                           1.00x
  terminal reinvestment rate implied by g/ROIC   40.8%
  exit multiple used vs steady-state warranted    2.20x

FINDINGS
  • EXIT_MULTIPLE_UNWARRANTED_AT_STEADY_STATE: 15.8x is 2.2x the 7.2x warranted at a 7%
    steady-state ROIC.

What it flagged, and the response:


3. Implied-path test (primary output)

reverse_dcf.py --spot 40.01 --shares 41.012942 --net-cash -1189.169 --revenue 1003.725 --terminal-margin 0.18 --exit-multiple 15.85 --fcf-margin 0.3041 --wacc 0.095

THE MARKET REQUIRES: revenue CAGR of −1.3% Held fixed: terminal margin 18.0%, exit multiple 15.85x, WACC 9.5%, 5 years.

The margin depends entirely on which "demonstrated" you use

Demonstrated basis Value Margin (demonstrated − required)
Screen's revenue_cagr_demonstrated +17.5% +18.8pp
ARR (organic, like-for-like) +2.0% +3.3pp
Revenue ex-ShareFile −2.2% −0.9pp
Software licenses −5.0% −3.7pp

The honest number is +3.3pp, on ARR — the only measure that is both organic and forward-looking. The screen's +13.3pp is 10.0pp too generous because it counts a $875m acquisition as demonstrated growth.

Verdict: PASS WITH ARGUMENT. The required path (−1.3%) does sit below the organic demonstrated path (+2.0%). But it clears by 3.3pp, not 13.3pp, and it clears only at an exit multiple that steady_state_check says is 2.2x warranted.

Sensitivity over the exit multiple (the highest-variance parameter)

Exit EV/EBIT Required revenue CAGR vs organic +2.0%
7.2x (ROIC-warranted) not solvable in range — price unjustifiable at any growth rate FAIL
10.0x +5.2% −3.2pp FAIL
13.0x +1.5% +0.5pp marginal
15.85x (current, held flat) −1.3% +3.3pp PASS
20.0x −4.7% +6.7pp
25.0x −8.0% +10.0pp

The flip point is ~13.4x. PRGS's post-2024 EV/EBIT low is 13.3x — the name has already traded through its own flip point inside the current regime. This is not a robust PASS.

Terminal value share of EV at the base case is well above 60%, so per criteria.md the reverse DCF is the primary output and the forward DCF is supporting evidence only.


4. Twelve-month target — own multiple history, with the regime-overlap check

Regime overlap

Daily EV/Sales and EV/EBIT series built from Alpaca split-adjusted closes (2020-07-27 → 2026-07-29, n = 1,509), current share count and net debt held fixed so the series measures multiple movement, TTM revenue lagged 60 days to filing availability.

Series Window A (2020-07→2023-12) Window B (2024-01→2026-07) Share of B inside A's range
EV/Sales [4.78, 7.32], med 5.86 [2.27, 5.67], med 4.58 32.2%
EV/EBIT [21.2, 47.4], med 27.7 [13.3, 34.6], med 28.5 78.3%

The EV/Sales long series is rejected. Only 32.2% of the current regime overlaps the 2020–23 regime, which never once traded below 4.78x. Quoting a 6.2nd-percentile EV/Sales reading against a series whose floor is 2.1x above today's price is the ZS failure mode (12.7% overlap) in a milder form.

EV/EBIT overlaps at 78.3% and is admissible. It is also the right instrument: gross margin 80.8% (nowhere near the <15% low-margin trigger), positive EBIT every year, State A.

The anchor

EV/EBIT
Current 15.85x
Percentile within window B (2024–26) 10.1st
Percentile within the full 6-year series 4.3rd
Window B deciles 15.8 / 20.7 / 22.0 / 26.4 / 28.5 / 29.7 / 30.5 / 31.1 / 31.7
ROIC-warranted (§2) 7.2x

Base anchor: 15.85x — the current multiple, held flat, at the 10.1st percentile of the regime-valid window. No re-rating is assumed, and the reason is stated: every point in PRGS's own history, at every percentile, sits above the 7.2x its returns on capital warrant. A "reversion to the median" anchor here would be reverting to an unwarranted level. Under criteria.md the base may not sit below every stated anchor without argument — it does not; it sits at the current anchor.

Forward EBIT

1H FY2026 revenue $501.264m (+5%, +4% cc); 1H operating income $96.352m (19.22% margin). Full-year FY2026 at ~$1,020m revenue and an 18.0% margin gives EBIT ≈ $184m; the rolling 12-month figure one year out ≈ $190m.

Target

Anchor EV less net debt Equity Per share vs $40.01
7.2x (ROIC-warranted) $1,368m $1,189m $179m $4.36 −89%
13.0x (flip point) $2,470m $1,189m $1,281m $31.23 −22%
15.85x — BASE, 10.1st pctile $3,011m $1,189m $1,822m $44.43 +11.0%
22.0x (window-B 30th pctile) $4,180m $1,189m $2,991m $72.92 +82%
28.5x (window-B median) $5,415m $1,189m $4,226m $103.03 +158%

12-month target: $44 (+11%), at 15.85x EV/EBIT = the 10.1st percentile of the 2024–26 own-history window.

The spread from $4 to $103 across the multiple range is not a modelling failure; it is the finding. PRGS's equity is 42% geared, so it absorbs the entire multiple move, and the multiple is not anchored by the company's returns on capital. That is what a leveraged roll-up earning below its cost of capital looks like when you refuse to add back acquisition amortisation.


5. Criteria scoring

Criteria Type Verdict Basis
Quality BINDING FAIL COMPOUNDER archetype requires ROIC > WACC with an evidenced redeployment mechanism. ROIC 7.3–8.3% vs WACC ~9.5%. The mechanism exists ($1.5bn facility, 7 deals); the return does not. Organic ARR +2%, NRR 99–100%, licenses −5%. Cheap cannot rescue a failure here.
Valuation BINDING PASS WITH ARGUMENT Required −1.3% vs organic demonstrated +2.0% = +3.3pp. Argument is specific and evidenced (ARR +2% twice, NRR ≥99%, 80.8% gross margin, $305m TTM FCF). But it inverts to FAIL below a 13.4x exit multiple, and window B's own floor is 13.3x.
Accounting quality MEASURED Growth is acquired, not organic ShareFile 26.8% of FY2025 revenue; ex-ShareFile −2.2%; ARR +2%. Disclosure itself is good — the company gives the numbers needed to compute it.
Receivables / DSO MEASURED PASS Same-quarter DSO 45.4d, falling; zero factoring/securitisation language in the 10-K or 10-Q, so the fall is real.
Retired or redefined metric MEASURED FLAG NRR band restated 100–102% → 99–100% between the FY2025 10-K and the Q2 FY2026 10-Q, uncommented.
Customer concentration MEASURED PASS No customer, partner or ex-US country >10% of revenue.
Mention-frequency split MEASURED INDETERMINATE EARNINGS_CALL_TRANSCRIPT not retrieved within the time-box. Missing input → INDETERMINATE, never FAIL.
Steady-state test MEASURED 1 flag EXIT_MULTIPLE_UNWARRANTED_AT_STEADY_STATE, 2.20x. Margin-ramp check clears.