RB Global [RBA]
As of 2026-07-30. Spot $110.76. Diluted shares 187.5m. Market cap $20,635m.
Sources: FY2025 10-K (filed 2026-02-25, rba-20251231.htm), Q1'26 10-Q (filed 2026-05-04,
rba-20260331.htm), Alpha Vantage normalized statements, Alpaca daily bars.
The screen record ranks RBA on a 38.3% demonstrated revenue CAGR with a cagr_base_revenue of
$1,733.8m. That base is 2022 revenue. Ritchie Bros closed its acquisition of IAA on 20 March 2023.
The quarterly record shows the step directly:
| quarter | revenue ($m) |
|---|---|
| 2022-12-31 | 444 |
| 2023-03-31 | 512 ← 11 days of IAA |
| 2023-06-30 | 1,106 ← first full quarter with IAA |
| 2023-09-30 | 1,020 |
Revenue went from $444m to $1,106m in two quarters. The 38.3% "demonstrated CAGR" is a single
corporate event, not a demonstrated growth rate. This is the AIOT precedent exactly (screened +44.7pp;
63.5% of revenue acquired; legacy revenue down 1.0%), and it is the whole reason RBA screened at
+23.3pp. The screen's own notes field flagged the symptom — "latest quarter 11.4% is below the 38.3%
trailing CAGR the rank uses — the ranking signal is stale" — without identifying the cause.
| FY2024 | FY2025 | Q1'26 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total GTV | — | +2% | +13% |
| Service GTV | — | +1% | +12% |
| Total lots sold | — | +1% | 0% |
| Total revenue | — | +7% | +11% |
| Service revenue | — | +4% | +5% |
| Inventory sales revenue | — | +18% | +32% |
And Q1'26's +13% GTV is itself not organic: it includes J.M. Wood Auction Co. (closed 14 July 2025) and Smith Broughton Pty Ltd (closed 28 November 2025), partially offset by the deconsolidation of SYNETIQ on 21 June 2025 in the LKQ transaction. The company attributes the increase to "organic growth across all regions and sectors and the inclusion of J.M. Wood ... and Smith Broughton" without quantifying the split.
Demonstrated organic revenue growth is 4–7%. Service revenue — the commission business, unaffected by principal/agent mix — grew 4% in FY2025 and 5% in Q1'26. That is the number, and it is 31–34 percentage points below what the screen ranked the name on.
RBA's revenue is not comparable across periods without the mix, and the 10-K says so in its own risk language: "a change in the revenue mix between service revenue and revenue from inventory sales can have a significant impact on our revenue growth percentages."
| FY2024 | FY2025 | Q1'25 | Q1'26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Service GTV ($m) | 14,984.2 | 15,113.4 | 3,572.8 | 4,004.0 |
| Service revenue ($m) | ~3,365 | ~3,500 | 855.0 | 897.7 |
| Service take rate | 22.46% | 23.16% | 23.93% | 22.42% |
FY2025 take rate rose 70bp; Q1'26 fell 151bp year over year. The FY2025 rise was explicitly monetisation, not volume: "Transactional buyer revenue increased 8%, while total GTV increased 2%, primarily due to changes to our buyer fee structures, which were implemented in late-2024 and early-2025." Meanwhile the seller side went the other way: "Although commission rates in both the automotive and CC&T sectors were largely flat compared to the prior year, the higher proportion of automotive service GTV in the current year led to a lower seller commission rate overall."
So the FY2025 take-rate gain was a one-time fee-schedule change, now annualised out — which is why Q1'26 gives back more than FY2025 gained. Marketplace services revenue actually fell 6% in FY2025.
| FY2024 | FY2025 | Q1'25 | Q1'26 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Inventory GTV ($m) | 920.6 | 1,088.5 | 256.1 | 336.9 |
| Inventory sales revenue ($m) | ~932 | ~1,100 | 256.1 | 336.9 |
| Inventory return ($m) | 56.8 | 57.9 | 21.1 | 30.2 |
| Inventory rate | 6.2% | 5.3% | 8.2% | 9.0% |
Inventory (principal) revenue grew +18% FY2025 and +32% Q1'26, against service revenue at +4% and +5%. RBA's reported revenue growth is being driven by the line that books gross GTV as revenue. In FY2025 the inventory return — the actual gross profit on $1,088.5m of inventory GTV — was $57.9m, a 5.3% rate, down 90bp. So the principal business added roughly $168m of reported revenue in FY2025 and $1.1m of gross profit.
This is the single most important optic in the name. Total revenue +7% against service revenue +4% means roughly 3pp of the headline is a revenue gross-up carrying a 5% margin. Q1'26 is worse: total revenue +11% against service revenue +5%.
Volume versus monetisation, answered: NEITHER. Lots sold grew 1% in FY2025 and 0% in Q1'26. GTV growth is average price per lot plus acquisitions. Revenue growth is fee-schedule changes (now lapped) plus a principal-basis gross-up. The underlying unit volume of the marketplace is flat.
| FY2025 GTV | $m | growth | lots sold growth |
|---|---|---|---|
| Automotive | 8,659.1 | +5% | +7% |
| Commercial construction & transportation (CC&T) | 5,663.6 | −2% | −13% |
| Other | 1,879.2 | +3% | −8% |
| Total | 16,201.9 | +2% | +1% |
CC&T lots sold fell 13% and Other fell 8%. The legacy Ritchie Bros industrial-equipment business — the higher-take-rate half — is in a volume downcycle, and consolidated growth is being held up by the acquired IAA automotive-salvage business. Q1'26 reverses this (CC&T GTV +27% on +12% lots), but the company attributes it to "higher average price per lot sold, higher unit volumes and a favourable foreign exchange impact" plus the two acquisitions.
The automotive line carries its own cyclicality that the company names explicitly: FY2025 automotive GTV growth was reduced by "the non-recurrence of significant catastrophic events in the prior year" — i.e. insurance-salvage volume depends on hurricanes and hail. That is an exogenous cycle input by definition, and it is why this name is State B.
The FY2025 10-K's key-operating-metric list is "Gross Transaction Value, Inventory return, Inventory rate, Total lots sold." The Q1'26 10-Q list drops the phrase "Low value assets are sometimes bundled into a single lot, collectively referred to as 'small value lots'" from the definition of Total lots sold. The definition of the lot-count denominator was quietly simplified in the quarter that lots sold went to 0% growth. Small, but it is precisely the pattern — a definitional change in the year the metric turns.
No other retirement found. GTV, service/inventory revenue, inventory rate and lots sold are all disclosed consistently across the two documents.
| 2025-12-31 | 2026-03-31 | |
|---|---|---|
| Trade and other receivables, net ($m) | 706.3 | 894.8 |
| Allowance for credit losses ($m) | 8.6 | 9.1 |
| Quarterly revenue ($m) | 1,222.0 | 1,234.6 |
| Same-quarter DSO (days) | 52.7 | 66.1 |
DSO deteriorated 13.4 days quarter over quarter, on revenue that grew 1.0%. Against the prior-year same quarter: Q1'25 revenue $1,109m; receivables at 2025-03-31 not retrieved, so the year-over-year same-quarter comparison is INDETERMINATE rather than estimated.
Factoring check — performed, per the CLS precedent. I searched the 10-K and 10-Q for receivables sales, factoring, securitisation and supply-chain finance. Zero hits on "factoring", "sold receivables" and "securitiz*" in the RBA 10-K. No receivables-sale programme is disclosed. So the 13.4-day DSO deterioration is real and is not masked by a sale — the opposite of the CLS case, where a genuine deterioration was hidden by $565m of sales. Recording the clean result explicitly.
The likely benign explanation is seasonal: auction proceeds payable rose from $457.9m to $687.1m (+50.1%) over the same quarter, so the receivable and the offsetting consignor payable moved together — a heavier auction calendar in Q1, not a collection problem. That is a hypothesis, not a finding.
The words "largest customer" and "concentration" appear zero times in the FY2025 10-K. RBA does not disclose customer concentration. But its own MD&A repeatedly attributes swings to individual contracts: "the non-recurrence of transportation fees related to a significant customer contract in the United States"; "the non-recurrence of third-party profit-sharing costs associated with a significant customer contract in the prior year"; CC&T GTV down partly on "the non-recurrence of certain significant customer contracts."
A company whose MD&A explains three separate line-item movements by reference to unnamed "significant customer contracts", while disclosing no concentration figure, has material single-customer exposure it is not quantifying. IAA's business is insurance-carrier salvage, where a handful of national carriers control most volume. This is the AAOI structural setup — a large undisclosed counterparty — with the difference that here the absence of the disclosure is what is observable. Recorded as INDETERMINATE with the reason, not as a pass.
The Q1'26 balance sheet carries Series A Senior Preferred Shares of $482.0m in temporary equity (mezzanine), paying $6.7m of cumulative dividends per quarter plus allocated earnings of $4.6m. Net income of $135.6m becomes $124.6m available to common — an 8.1% haircut. This is a redeemable, dividend-bearing senior claim and it belongs in enterprise value. The screen omits it entirely.
Named: international expansion of the automotive-salvage marketplace. International GTV grew +7% in FY2025 and +53% in Q1'26 to $426.6m, and the company attributes automotive GTV growth to "market share gains, including the full-year impact of certain contract wins in the prior year and international expansion" and to "attracting record-high engagement from international buyers." A cross-border buyer base raises clearing prices on a fixed supply of salvage, which lifts GTV and commission revenue with no incremental lot volume — which is exactly what the FY2025 numbers show (price up, lots flat).
Its size is the problem. International is $1,333.4m of $16,201.9m GTV — 8.2%. Growing 53% off 8.2% of the base adds roughly 4pp to consolidated GTV growth at best. That is a real mechanism, and it is not large enough to support a 15% five-year revenue CAGR.
| Item | Screen / vendor | Correct | Magnitude |
|---|---|---|---|
revenue_cagr_demonstrated |
38.3% | organic service-revenue growth 4–5%; total revenue 7–11% | 31–34pp. The entire +23.3pp valuation margin is this |
gross_margin_pct |
16.7% | 45.6% (AV) / Q1'26 gross profit $563m on $1,235m revenue | 28.9pp. At 16.7% the terminal margin of 15.5% nearly breached m_EBIT,T ≤ m_gross,T — a manufactured constraint violation |
net_cash |
−$1,655m (Cash − LongTermDebt only) | −$4,024m: short-term debt $282.0m + current LTD $51.2m + LTD $2,271.0m + operating leases $1,605.1m + Series A preferred $482.0m − unrestricted cash $667.2m | $2,369m, 143% understated. EV understated 10.6% ($22,290m → $24,659m) |
op_margin_pct |
15.5% | FY2025 ~18.2% filed; TTM 18.3% | −2.8pp |
AV cashAndCashEquivalentsAtCarryingValue |
$862.2m | balance sheet cash is $667.2m; restricted cash is a separate $192.2m line | $192.2m / 28.8% overstated — AV folds restricted cash into cash. For an auction house restricted cash is consignor money |
AV operatingIncome Q1'26 |
$222m | 10-Q $217.5m | $4.5m / 2.1% high |
AV shortLongTermDebtTotal |
$4,257.4m | filed total debt incl. leases $4,209.3m | $48m / 1.1% — essentially clean, reported per the verify-per-name rule |
AV SPLITS |
3.0000 on 2008-04-28; 2.0000 on 2004-05-07 | both pre-window | no corporate action inside the analysis window; clean |
terminal_margin_basis "own trailing operating margin" |
15.5% | the trailing margin is 18.3%; the stored value is 2.8pp below the company's own actual | joins the 21-of-84 population the terminal-margin audit found |