TTAN · investment memo
BUILT bottom-up, not defaulted: 80% platform gross margin (78.7% actual and rising) less a 3pp professional-services drag = 77% blended, less 57% mature opex (S&M 22% + R&D 20% + G&A 15%) = 20%. SBC is INCLUDED, not added back - the 20% embeds SBC normalising from 20.5% of revenue today to ~10%. The screen used 11.2%, described as 'industry median (pre-profit)', a generic placeholder that ignored a 78.7% platform gross margin and sits below the worst row of the memo's own sensitivity grid.
Four distinct questions, one field each. A price is not a thesis: the trigger below forces a re-underwrite and freezes further purchases — it is never an automatic sell.
A daily close below $62.92 triggers a mandatory re-underwrite and freezes further purchases. It is not an automatic sell unless a separate fundamental invalidation condition has been breached.
Not stated. This name has no falsifiable invalidation conditions on file, so it cannot be risk-monitored. That is a gap in the research, not a clean bill of health — recorded rather than hidden.
Type: MEASURED. Logged and scored; blocks nothing. Named cause: a US residential-trades volume contraction, transmitted directly into TTAN revenue through GTV. This is not a volatility statement and it is not generic macro. It is the mechanism from §2 run in reverse. ~80–90% of TTAN's revenue growth is its customers' invoiced volume. GTV growth is already the binding input, and the company's own risk factors name "changes in spending on home and commercial services" and "consolidation of trades businesses" as direct revenue risks. A residential-services downturn — deferred HVAC replacement, de